As Moldova approaches its 28 September parliamentary elections, the information space is under unprecedented strain. In just three weeks, nearly 10,000 TikTok videos pushed by inauthentic networks generated over 93 million views—an industrial-scale campaign of manipulation targeting a country of only 2.3 million citizens. From AI-generated smear clips and “Orthodox defender” websites to Belarusian bots and paid influence networks tied to Ilan Șor, the tactics are multiplying, adapting, and mutating faster than platforms or regulators can respond.
This edition of the FACT Newsletter brings together the latest investigations from Context.ro, Expert Forum, WatchDog.md, Promo-LEX, and RISE Moldova, exposing how these operations work, what narratives they amplify, and why disinformation remains one of the Kremlin’s most powerful tools in the region. At the same time, it highlights the voices of citizens and cultural figures who call for resilience, vigilance, and informed participation in the democratic process.
The Infrastructure of an Information War: 93 Million Views in Three Weeks
A new study by Expert Forum (EFOR) exposes the industrial scale of propaganda flooding Moldova’s TikTok ahead of elections. Between September 1 and 23, nearly 9,900 videos from about 500 monitored accounts generated 93 million views and 169 million interactions—staggering numbers in a country of just 2.3 million citizens.
The main tactic is blunt but effective: overwhelming feeds with manipulative, low-quality content, often produced with artificial intelligence, to amplify attacks against Maia Sandu and the ruling PAS party. The narratives are repeated obsessively: persecution, censorship, the victimization of Evghenia Guțul, emotional stories of illness or injustice, and anti-EU, anti-PAS messaging.
The data also reveal regional contamination: accounts based in Belarus and Russia exploit Moldovan hashtags to penetrate local feeds. Not every account is directly connected, but together they reproduce the same propaganda line through similar tactics and relentless reposting. The bigger picture is stark—how can a small democracy withstand a 24/7 propaganda machine designed to overwhelm and destabilize its public sphere?
Operation Matrioshka in Moldova. Fake videos featuring Charlie Kirk vs. Maia Sandu and Foreign Minister Oana Țoiu, who accuses Chișinău of encouraging pedophilia
„Sex tourism involving minors in the Republic of Moldova has increased tenfold”, according to a quote attributed to Romanian Foreign Minister Oana Țoiu in a clip posted on TikTok, which is clearly fake. “The number of immigrants selling drugs from Moldova has increased to 40%,” says another misleading clip. Several dozen such videos were produced as part of Operation Matrioshka, which is attributed to the Russian Federation.
On the eve of parliamentary elections, dozens of clips were published on X and TikTok in which the Republic of Moldova is transformed into a major exporter of illegal weapons for organized crime in Germany, a country that supports pedophilia or that will disrupt the European Union’s economy. The fake clips, some generated with AI, were produced as part of Operation Matrioshka, which has been attributed to the Russian Federation in official reports. A group of experts analyzed the data for Context.ro and *FACT and explained how the operation works.
Moldova’s 2025 Elections: Kremlin-Linked Influence Network Intensifies
Context.ro compiles recent investigations showing a coordinated effort to sway Moldova’s parliamentary vote. An undercover probe by Ziarul de Gardă documents a paid “InfoLider” network tied to Ilan Șor’s Bloc Victorie/Partidul Victoriei, with hundreds of “communication activists” organized by regions and remunerated via a Russian bank, local cards, or crypto. Their prime target is the ruling PAS, while operators were instructed to boost Victoria Furtună’s pro-Russian “Moldova Mare.” The same network pushed post-election narratives in Romania in support of George Simion, amplifying claims that “people vote for one, another wins.”
WatchDog.md’s ad-tracking shows heavy spending concentrated in Șor’s ecosystem between April 30–July 28: 1,505 Meta ads (≈€45,000) and at least 319 YouTube ads, including via pages like MD24 and reactivated anonymous outlets. A separate leak indicates Șor recruited senior alumni of major Russian banks to A7, a crypto/payments firm, to help evade sanctions. Disinfo Digest maps the propaganda pillars—“rupture, pressure, manipulation”—featuring themes that label Sandu/PAS as authoritarian and pre-emptively allege election fraud, including attacks on the election commission and vote-by-mail.
Telegram “Local News,” Moscow Playbook
An investigation by Context.ro uncovers a 32-channel Telegram network, created from Moscow within minutes and reactivated ahead of Moldova’s vote, that camouflages political propaganda as “local news.” The channels push anti-EU and anti-government narratives, AI-generated materials, and messaging for pro-Russian candidates (including Victoria Furtună), while cross-posting content across towns to simulate organic reach. A leaked payment ledger identifies 134 operatives behind Telegram bots, funded by fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor with nearly €1.8M in 2024 and ~€1M in 2025 (roughly €9,000 per activist), illustrating a centrally managed influence system that fuses coordinated timing, automation, and localized branding.
Russia’s Propaganda Machine: Blocked Today, Back Tomorrow
RISE Moldova shows just how hard it is to silence Moscow’s digital echo chambers. Since the war in Ukraine began, Moldova’s intelligence service has blocked more than a hundred Kremlin-linked sites. This year alone, over 35 more were added to the blacklist—some spewing AI-fabricated news, others leaking troves of parliamentary emails. And yet, the cycle repeats: sites vanish, only to reappear under new domains, hosted abroad, dressed up as “Orthodox defenders” or “truth-tellers.”
Take mostenire.online, registered to a Russian from Crimea, mixing religious appeals with TikTok clips and Telegram petitions. Or the fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor, whose banned party’s website keeps coming back under fresh names. Even figures in Russia’s Duma, like lawyer Rinat Meșcerov, are helping fuel these projects. The message is clear: Moldova’s firewalls may delay the flood, but they cannot stop it. In the age of VPNs, AI content, and endless clones, disinformation doesn’t die—it mutates. And with elections looming, each reborn site carries the same mission: to destabilize, divide, and keep Moldova trapped in Moscow’s shadow.
Ilustration: Roman Filippov / RISE Moldova.
Student Voices vs. the Propaganda Machine
A short video interview produced by Context.ro and Info Sud-Est captures how Russian disinformation is shaping the media environment for young Moldovans ahead of the 28 September parliamentary elections. Marina, a Moldovan graduate now living in Romania, describes peers being pulled into closed “bubbles” of persuasive content without realizing it, and urges voters to spend time—at least the Sunday before voting—reading party platforms. Despite the “tense” climate at home, she argues that Moldova’s future lies with Europe, citing the visible differences she has experienced in EU member states. The piece offers a ground-level view of how aggressive narratives circulate and why basic information literacy remains critical for first-time and young voters.
“A Thousand Ways to Tilt the Feed”: The Costiuc TikTok Network, Mapped
Context.ro, building on an initial network study by Expert Forum (EFOR), provided a database of over 2,000 TikTok clips to PROMPT (European Narrative Observatory) for detailed analysis. The investigation revealed 1,390 instances of manipulation techniques used by accounts promoting Vasile Costiuc, leader of Democrația Acasă and an ally of Romania’s AUR.
EFOR first identified a coordinated cluster of 17 TikTok accounts that pushed #vasilecostiuc to more than one million views in a single week—a 300% increase compared to the previous period—supported by nearly 1,000 suspicious follower accounts. PROMPT’s subsequent analysis confirmed systematic duplication, “twin” and clustered accounts, heavy content recycling, and emotionally charged storytelling around victimhood, economic hardship, and diaspora struggles. Rural imagery and nativist tropes—grapes, honey, or local fruit set against imported bananas—were used to anchor narratives of betrayal and mobilization.
The network’s operators also encouraged mass sharing to turn users into amplifiers, while claims of censorship reinforced a narrative of persecution. These same themes circulated off-platform through the Kremlin-linked Pravda network and Sputnik-affiliated Telegram channels, creating an illusion of independent corroboration. The findings highlight how disguised political advertising on social platforms exploits systemic vulnerabilities, underlining the need for stronger transparency obligations for major platforms.
Fake Accounts Flood TikTok with #alegmoldova
Promo-LEX exposed a massive TikTok network that hijacked the platform’s algorithm ahead of Moldova’s elections. Just 25 core accounts, multiplied into nearly 500 clones, drove the hashtag #alegmoldova to 1.3 million views in three days.
Using AI-generated voices and recycled visuals, the network spread anti-EU narratives, cast Maia Sandu’s government as a “Western puppet,” and framed EU integration as tied to “LGBTQ propaganda.” The operation created a false wave of popular support—an orchestrated digital intoxication campaign masquerading as grassroots sentiment.
Belarusian Bots Push Kremlin Narratives into Moldova’s Elections
An investigation by the Belarusian Investigative Center (BIC) for Context.ro and the FACT platform uncovered how Belarus-based propaganda networks redirected their usual Kremlin messaging toward Moldova’s parliamentary elections. Over 80 TikTok clips—some uploaded from the Netherlands and Finland—attacked President Maia Sandu as “rusophobic” and portrayed Gagauzia’s governor, Evghenia Guțul, as a political victim.
The operation, linked to pro-Lukașenko and pro-Kremlin outlets, amassed nearly 2 million views. Clips mimicking news reports and using inflammatory rhetoric accused the ruling PAS government of jailing opponents and pushing the country into war. By staging content abroad and cross-posting through Telegram and TikTok, the network sought to mask its origins and amplify anti-EU, pro-Russian narratives.
The findings, part of the EU-backed FACT initiative, show how Belarusian digital mercenaries play a direct role in shaping Moldova’s information space ahead of a decisive vote.
Irina Rimes on Voting, Values, and Disinformation
In a video interview with Context.ro ahead of the 28 September elections, singer–songwriter Irina Rimes urges Moldovans to treat election day as a civic celebration and to defend democracy by voting and verifying information from multiple sources. She warns that traditions and religious themes are increasingly weaponized in politics—including by the far right—and says even the Church feels politicized. For Rimes, EU integration is not just economics but security and rule of law; the alternative, she argues, is the “logic of force.”
