Corpus Analysis (TikTok)
Provided by Context.ro and Expert Forum for narrative analysis in PROMPT Social Data Studio
Vasile Costiuc president of Democratia Acasa political platform, boosts his profile visibility through a network of affiliated TikTok accounts, spreading manipulative content and outright disinformation. Here we examine the narrative pathways, rhetorical patterns and emotional appeals of his messaging.
We mentioned in an earlier piece about the integrated strategy simultaneously targeting Moldova, Romania & Ukraine, through vast, transnationally spanning disinformation networks and coordinated influence operations. The cross-border spillovers are evident. George Simion, the far-right leader of AUR (a Romanian political party with spinoffs in Moldova), is a vocal supporter of Costiuc and his political platform. The rhetorical arsenal follows similar if not identical patterns across an identifiable repertoire of topics/themes: from the grievances of local farmers and producers, to asserting sovereignty and ‘taking back control’ of the government, economy, whilst dismantling the ‘illegitimate, corrupt establishment’.
The targets of this messaging (emanating from Costiuc and affiliates) extend beyond the political sphere, into civil society, media, and other domains (prompting libels against his network from reputed civic activists, journalists, etc.). In fact, this is a crucial conceptual shift, as it demonstrates how propagandists (like Costiuc) are not merely competing in electoral politics but are actively working to reshape an entire ecosystem of public discourse – essentially redefining who is trustworthy, which narratives are legitimate, and which forms of civic participation are acceptable. The discourse, therefore, moves beyond winning the parliamentary elections, into a socio-political purge and change of paradigm.
- Coordination & Amplification Patterns
There are approximately 337 duplicate entries or identical content repeats across multiple TikTok accounts (2171 total entries in the dataset). These are not merely occasional overlaps; they indicate a systematic practice of cross-posting similar or identical scripts. In practice, the accounts may be either centrally managed or follow a coordinated distribution pipeline.
Interactive Graph (Costiuc_account_repeat_network)
At least 11 TikTok accounts recycled their own content heavily, with nearly 200 unique transcripts reposted, adding up to 274 redundant pushes. Even without cross-account coordination, single accounts try to game TikTok’s algorithm by reposting the same script multiple times – a tactic consistent with content flooding.
Furthermore, some account pairs share dozens of transcripts, forming the ‘spine’ of the network, the hubs that recycle narratives most aggressively. In many cases, the same accounts reappear across multiple strong edges (connections), suggesting a core cluster of operators tied together by repeated scripts.
Two distinct coordination patterns emerge:
- Twin accounts: pairs of accounts that consistently post almost identical content, suggesting they are controlled by the same operator or team. These are essentially ‘mirrors’ of each other, used to multiply the visibility of identical messages.
- Cluster accounts: larger groups where each account is strongly linked to multiple others through shared scripts. This dynamic creates a dense web of cross-posting that gives the impression of a grassroots swarm and organic support, while in reality, it is a tightly managed cluster.
Thus, the network expands by replicating the same narratives across a web of interconnected accounts. The most influential ties reveal which accounts are moving in unison, demonstrating that what appears to be a chorus of voices is, in reality, a centrally controlled echo-chamber. Intriguingly, the narratives and rhetorical devices mirror deep emotional appeals: the struggles of local farmers and producers, localised economic grievances, victimhood and persecution, and so forth. Many of the repetitive scripts also centre on personal tragedies – a husband who lost his toes and survives on a modest disability pension, parents unable to afford surgeries, a family evicted from their home – aiming to attract a vast (outraged) audience and trigger emotional responses. Also, the Moldovan diaspora and its plight ‘far from home’ is heavily referenced across repetitive scripts.
Other posts deploy symbols of everyday life and rural identity, asserting classic nativist tropes: references to local grapes, honey, pears and schoolchildren eating local fruit, contrasted with foreign-imported bananas. Together, these narratives produce a carefully calibrated sense of victimhood and betrayal, which demands regime change and the mass mobilisation against the corrupt government.
A striking feature of this network is the direct mobilisation of users as amplifiers. The examples below, processed through the PROMPT social data analysis tool, show how audiences are instructed to act: to repost content, to flood TikTok with new accounts, to share clips widely, to overwhelm perceived opponents online. In this particular content, amplification is framed not just as engagement, but as a form of political struggle.
These calls to action are reinforced by a steady stream of posts claiming persecution and censorship of the Democratia Acasa political bloc, of Vasile Costiuc and his affiliated networks. TikTok suspensions, alleged state surveillance or blocked content are portrayed as proof of the ruling government’s desperation – otherwise a ubiquitous trope used by wider disinformation networks – and elections rigging (the current government as perpetrator).
Alongside mobilisation appeals, the network repeatedly targets civil society organisations and independent media. Watchdog groups are cast as corrupt agents of foreign interests (i.e. Soros), allegedly funded to protect the regime. Journalists and NGOs are lumped together with the government as part of a ‘system’ that ignores the people’s suffering (targeting rural/deprived areas). This rhetorical strategy delegitimises independent oversight and positions civil society as an enemy of the people – collapsing all institutional counterweights into a single hostile bloc. Similar patterns and rhetorical artifices are noticeable in Romania, featuring prominently in the far-right discourse.
For the narrative analysis, we identified 8587 rhetorical figures, their distribution consistent with wider coordination and amplification patterns, particularly the use of repetitions and redundant constructs for emphasis and reinforcement. The PROMPT analysis tool also detected over 1390 information manipulation techniques present in the TikTok corpus, amongst the most frequent:
The use of rhetorical figures shows how style reinforces substance, not incidentally, but converging with manipulation techniques to maximise memorability, emotional impact, and the viewers’ engagement or even political mobilisation. The graph below shows the distribution by count of occurrences.
Interactive Graph_Costiuc Network Rhetorical Figures
Static version:
In a nutshell, the constellations of rhetorical figures function together as amplifiers of persuasion. Emotional storytelling and sensory descriptions make hardship vivid and relatable, while contrasts and false equivalencies reduce complex (lived) realities to stark binaries. Repetition and redundancy, featuring most prominently, reinforce the messaging until it becomes self-evident, while rhetorical questioning simulates dialogue, guiding audiences towards (usually) pre-set conclusions.
Building on the multiplatform datasets, Vasile Costiuc, the leader of Democratia Acasa political bloc, also featured in the Russian-spun Pravda network and Romanian language affiliates, at least 7 times between July and August 2025. These web outlets, part of a much wider disinformation and propaganda ecosystem, amplified the same narratives of victimhood and persecution circulating on TikTok (through the network of coordinated accounts), portraying Costiuc as being silenced, harassed, or marginalised by politically complicit state institutions and hostile media. The Sputnik Telegram channel follows the same pattern. In fact, the Pravda network repeatedly cites as sources Telegram channels that are themselves notorious vectors of disinformation and influence operations: Triunghiul Basarbean, Sputnik necenzurat etc. By layering these citations, this multiplatform propaganda network produces an illusion of corroboration, transitioning from Telegram, TikTok onto the web, while masking central coordination.
